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I. Introduction 
Elliot Jaques has proposed to measure responsibility of a given job by the time 
span ~Jdiscrrtion (TSD). This, in turn, has been defined as "the longest period 
which can elapse in a r6le before the manager can be sure that his subordinate 
has not been exercising marginally sub-standard discretion continuously in 
balancing the pace and quality of his work. This period in erect gives the 
maximum time during which the manager must rely upon the discretion of his 
subordinate and the subordinate works of his own'." A number of extensive 
studies have shown, furthermore, that there is a very close positive association 
between pay and TSD giving a remarkably good statistical fit over a wide range 
of data2. Jaques' explanation for this finding is a sociological one: He assumes 
wages to conlirm broadly to the normative beliefs regarding equitable pay 
prevailing in society and argues that equitable pay is associated to TSD. 
Deviations ofactual pay from equitable pay - and hence not confirming to TSD 
-will cause social tensions which hurt productivity and will thus be avoided3. 
He takes, however, the equitable pay-TSD relationship as given, and one 
might reasonably ask whether this normative belief is determined genetically or 
has been learned in a social process. If innate, the theory can be accepted; if 
learned, we have to assume a learning process which will ultimately explain the 
prevailing social norms. 
Social psychology, however, suggests that norms are adopted by an indivi- 
dual within a group because these norms are already preexistent within this 
JAQUES [1976], p. 109. 
The reader is referred to Fig. 14.2 (p. 230) in JAQUES [1976]. This book contains also 
references to many empirical studies confirming this regularity. 
3 A similar position can be found in THUROW 119751, p. 104-113 for instance. 
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group or - even worse - norms simply adapt to actual experience via selective 
exposure to new information. In this way reasons supporting the status quo are 
selected in order to establish norms in harmony with actual experience4. All this 
amounts to the conclusion that norms of equity adapt to a given economic 
situation rather than vice versa. 
But even if one dislikes the reductionist approach of social psychology to 
social phenomena and prefers, say, a functionalist approach, the functional 
usefulness of the pay-TSD norm remains to be demonstrated, and this brings us 
back, again, to economics5. 
2. An Economic Explunutiun for the Pay-TSD Rrlationship 
What seems to be necessary, therefore, is an economic theory demonstrating the 
competitive dominance of the pay-TSD relation which will, in turn, give rise to 
the existence of the equitable pay-TSD relation as a social norm. 
1 will try to develop an extremely simple theory in the following which might 
serve for this very purpose as a first step. 
Starting with heroical assumptions, an economy will be postulated which is 
endowed with only one kind of homogeneous labour". At a given instant, there 
wage distribution 
Fig. I 
This would be one possible application of Festingers famous theory of cognitive 
dissonance. 
' The function to promote social peace is obviously best fulfilled by any norm 
rcconfinning the status quo. For another approach to the theory of social norms see 
WERTHEIMER [I9351 and SCHL~CHT [1979]. 
The following analysis is similar to the one in SCHLICHT [I9781 and also closely 
related to Burdett's theory of job search. 
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is a certain wage distribution characterised by a density function f (w) which 
gives the relative number of workers working at the wage w (Fig. 1). It is 
assumed that different jobs are paid diflerently, in general, and that identical 
jobs are paid identically. 
All workers are trying to improve their pay by getting a better (i.e. higher- 
paid) job. On the other hand, any worker who performs his job insufficiently 
will be dismissed instantaneously. 
Because of dismissal, retirement, and promotion there are different job offers 
available. The probability of finding a better paid job, however, will be the 
smaller the higher the wage is which a given worker already receives. Hence the 
firm will know that the higher its wage offer is, the longer will the applicant 
expect to stay with the firm: Expected time r of staying with the firm will be a 
function of the wage offer, algebraically: 
Consider now the time span of discretion of various jobs. It is obviously 
important that those workers performing jobs with a high TSD, say of several 
years (corresponding to the upper income bracket according to Jaques) should 
expect themselves to be with the firm for several years in order that there is any 
incentive for them to make good decisions. Consider for instance the case of a 
manager who has to decide about long-range issues: I t  is important that he will 
not aim at short-run profits at thc expense of future performance in order to 
have a good time during the next couple of months or so after which he expects 
to leave the firm anyhow. Ilathcr, he h i s  to feel a strong commitment to the 
long run well-being of the firm7. This commitment will be particularly strong i f  
he expects and desires to hold the job for a long lime. In this case he will try to 
fulfill his duty. He will try to avoid dismissal and not to disappoint the 
expectations of his associates in the futurex. This will hold true. however. i f  the 
wage attached to thejob is rather high and the expectation to get an even better 
paid job is very small in consequence. On the other hand, if the wage paid for a 
certain job is rather low and the TSD is large. the worker will expect to leave the 
firm hefore his decisions can be evaluated and i t  might be a matter of 
indikrrnce whether he would be dismissed i f  he remained with the firm for a 
sufficiently long time. There will be no incentive to perform responsibly. 
In conclusion it will pay for the firm to offer wages which are positively 
related to TSD for pure efficiency reasons. The argument might be summarized 
algebraically as follows: A typical lirm has n jobs. The expected efficiency of 
performance of job i will be dependent upon the time span of expected 
attachment ri to this job; ri  is, in turn, a function of the wage rate according to 
' This issue has been discussed in a dinerent context in v. WEIZS;~CKER and SCHLICHT 
[1977], pp. 591. The commitment approach developed there provides the foundation for 
the present analysis. 
Here it is that sociological and psychological considerations might enter. 
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(1). The firm produces its value-added according to a production function 
where the T~(S  enter as arguments: 
If oi denotes the wage rate attached to job i, and if (1) is taken into account, 
the firm has to solve the maximization problem 
leading to the necessary conditions9 
These imply wage differentials between different jobs according to the 
productivity of increments in the time of attachment: 
In particular, equal pay i to all jobs will not be viable if the cp, differ for r ,  = z ,  
all i, and any positive i. The economic argument behind that is that with wage 
equality there will be no incentive to change the job - but dismissal will be no 
deterrent either preventing the workers to perform insufficiently. Hence, a 
certain "natural" rate of labour turnover will emerge and i t  will pay for the 
individual lirm to make the jobs with high TSD more attractive in order to 
achieve sufficient commitment. 
The argument has been stripped to the bones to make it as clear as possible. It 
could possibly be dressed up now in quite different ways for different theoretical 
parts and purposes. It  seems to be quite important to drop the assumption of a 
homogeneous labour supply since the performance of dilferent jobs provides - 
via on-the-job-training - workers with different capabilities; and the k t  that a 
worker has done a certain job without dismissal provides a distinguishing 
quality indicator. All these features, however, will serve as additional arguments 
for wage differentials. 
- 
Although this might be more important than the TSD factor analyzed in this 
paper, no convincing theory seems to be available up to now. Nevertheless, the 
If cp( . )  is strictly concave, the sufficient conditions are fulfilled: The Hessian 
associated to (3) can be written as 
H =  diag (T ( 4 ) ( c p i j )  diag (r (00) +diag (w" (04 
which is negative definite if ((pij) is negative definite. Hence uniqueness is guaranteed, too. 
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TSD-wage relationship might be of considerable importance, as suggested by 
the evidence given in support to Jaques' theory. Furthermore, this note might 
serve to  illustrate the issue between economists and sociologists on the interpre- 
tation of social laws. 
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